It was freshman year that I first became aware of the word epistemology. David provided a handy, catchy and easy to remember definition for it which consisted of the answer to the question “How do I know what I know and how do I know that I know it?” – a less tongue twister version of the same question would be “What does it mean to call something true, and what are the means for finding out that that thing is true?”. Some years later, I now find myself somewhat more familiar with the meaning and discussion of epistemology, but if one was to ask me what my personal epistemology was I would have to confess that I have no idea how to answer them.
There are, to my mind, two particular points of difficulty that form the crux of the problem which I face when confronted with this question.
The first point of difficulty lies in what I feel is a general lack of knowledge and ability to talk about the issue. I mentioned above that I am now more familiar with the conversation on epistemology than I was prior – but I mean that in the way that first year German student is more familiar with the language after taking classes for a few quarters than is a person who has gone completely without. Yes, he is able to speak and understand a few phrases and can grapple with the syntax a bit, but he is far from being able to engage in a conversation with a native German that has any degree of depth and profundity. This is how I feel about epistemology. I am familiar with the lingo, but when it comes to the epistemology of my life personally I feel again slightly perplexed as to what that means. It seems that what I have knowledge of is a smashing of scattered notions, camps, positions, categories and truth claims. But this scattering is rather incomplete, and what the significance and meaning of them beyond abstract theory is is completely beyond me.
This leads into the second point: how do these terms about truth play out in every day life? This is an even bigger point of tension: if I am being asked about my own personal epistemology then I am being asked how it is that these notions, camps, positions and categories take significance and impact my own personal existential existence. I cannot answer that because I am not sure what any of those terms mean outside of the abstract.
To at least provide something on the topic of epistemology, here is at least some information on the topic I am cognizant of:
On the subject of what it means to call something true, there are straight away two competing theories or perspectives that can be put on the table: the correspondence theory of truth, and the coherence theory of truth. Those who hold the correspondence theory of truth would say that to claim something is true is to say that there is a direct correspondence to reality, i.e., a statement is true is if is an accurate and legitimate manifestation of objective reality. Those who hold a coherence theory of truth would have none of this: for them, something is true if and when it is internally consistent, regardless of whether or not there is any correspondence to the external world. The distinction between this is best and most easily seen in the realm of mathematics. Euclid, a holder of the correspondence theory, would say that his geometry is true because it is a system of logically certain deduction based on true and indisputable postulates. Because his postulates are accurate representations of reality, his propositions are also accurate representations, and thus they are true as well. If his postulates were false, then he would call the system false, regardless of whether or not his deduction was flawless. As such, Euclid (or Aristotle, or Plato, or Reid) would call non-Euclidean geometry false – for the very reason that it had illegitimate postulates. Coherence theory of truth holders (Frege, Cantor, Russell) would contest this, and say that non-Euclidean geometry is just as true as Euclidean because both systems are internally consistent and merely have their own unique foundations.
Post-modern relativists would probably hold a similar claim and present a similar argument to those modern mathematicians, saying if you do not hold any views that are contradictory to one another, then your views are true – true for you.
Another pair of groups that are undoubtedly related in some way to the views mentioned above are the Realists and the Nominalists. These two terms are most commonly found in the realm of philosophy, particularly in regard to the problem of universals and particulars. Universals are broad, general concepts, such as justice, beauty, goodness etc. Particulars are individual instances of that concept that play out in the world. For example, a beautiful flower, a beautiful picture or a beautiful woman are all unique particulars of the same universal: beauty. Realists such as Plato or Aristotle would believe that these universals are real, actual, objective things – not just tags we create within our minds for the purpose of organization. Justice is a real thing separate from us, not just a category into which we put particular instances. Nominalists hold the inverse of this opinion. There are no actual universal ideas apart from our minds; they are but arbitrary distinctions that we/our minds create for the purpose of order and organization.
Another couple of terms that come up when the question of truth is on the table are rationalism and empiricism. These two terms are generally put into the context of scientific discovery and exploration, they are two different scientific modes of thought. Rationalism emphasizes mental reasoning over the use of induction and gathering of empirical data: if you think diligently and carefully you can come to knowledge of how things work. The stereotype mascot of rationalism is Descartes, sitting in an arm chair, speculating as to the nature of the world. Empiricism, on the other hand, emphasizes the use and gathering of empirical data and evidence. How do we come to knowledge of the world? By investigating it, not by thinking about it. Francis Bacon and David Hume and typical examples of adherents to Empiricism.
I could go on presenting more terms and categories, but it would not serve to answer the question of what my personal epistemology is. The greatest difficulty here is finding out how it is all these terms and definitions work together. The way that I understand them is in relation to a particular field only. But if I isolate and separate these terms and relate them to particular categories only, then their significance will never leave the abstract. My own life and personal existence is not cut into particular distinct groups, and as such, it is hard to make epistemology into something that can be applied. When I look at life as a consistent whole, how can I make epistemology apply when it is cut up into particular segments?
This is the question that I face.